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We present a higher-order calculus ECC which naturally combines Coquand- 
Huet’s calculus of constructions and Martin-LX’s type theory with universes. ECC 
is very expressive, both for structured abstract reasoning and for program specitica- 
tion and construction. In particular, the strong sum types together with the type 
universes provide a useful module mechanism for abstract description of mathe- 
matical theories and adequate formalization of abstract mathematics. This allows 
comprehensive structuring of interactive development of specifcations, programs 
and proofs. After a summary of the meta-theoretic properties of the calculus, an 
w-Set (realizability) model of ECC is described to show how its essential properties 
can be captured set-theoretically. The mode1 construction entails the logical 
consistency of the calculus and gives some hints on how to adequately formalize 
abstract mathematics. Theory abstraction in ECC is discussed as a pragmatic 
application. 0 1991 Academic Press. Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of abstraction and modularization has been one of the central 
problems considered in the design of programming and specification 
languages. It is also important in proof engineering. In recent years, the 
growing interests in the theory and methodology of computer-assisted 
reasoning (cf., Burstall, 1986) have led to the development of various proof 
development systems many of which are based on type systems such as 
type theories of Martin-Liif (1973, 1984) and NuPRL (Constable, 1986), 
the Edinburgh logical framework (Harper et al., 1987), and the calculus 
of constructions (Coquand and Huet, 1988). To meet the challenge of 
“proving in the large,” one of the problems one faces is how to express 
abstract structures and modularize proof development so that large 
theorem-proving tasks can be conquered in a structured way. Practical 
experience shows that the lack of a module mechanism is a big obstacle to 
large proof development in applications. 
In this paper, we present and study an extended cakulus of constructions, 
ECC, which can be seen as a natural combination of Coquand-Huet’s 
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calculus of constructions (Coquand and Huet, 1988) and Martin-Lof’s type 
theory with universes (Martin-Lof, 1973). It extends the calculus of 
constructions with 
l C-types (or, strong sum types), and 
. a fully cumulative type hierarch?]. 
There are two main motivations to make these extensions. One is to con- 
sider the extended calculus as a programming logic for specification and 
development of programs (in a style similar to that of Martin-LGf’s type 
theory, cf., Nordstrom et al., 1990; Burstall, 1989). Another motivation, 
which we emphasize in this paper, is theory abstraction. C-types in ECC, 
together with the type hierarchy, provide a powerful abstraction 
mechanism so that abstract structures can be naturally expressed and 
mathematical theories can be abstractly described and structured, leading 
to a comprehensive structuring of mathematical texts in interactive proof 
development and program specification. The cumulative type hierarchy, 
inspired by the work of Martin-Lof (1973, 1984) and Coquand (1986a), 
also increases the expressiveness in another aspect so that, for example, 
abstract mathematics (e.g., abstract algebras, categories) may be adequately 
formalized. Furthermore, as the type hierarchy provides a strong and 
flexible form of polymorphism, ECC provides a higher-order module 
mechanism which supports structure sharing by parameterization in the 
style of programming language Pebble (Burstall and Lampson, 1984; 
Lampson and Burstall, 1988; Burstall, 1984). 
The strong sum, Cx: A. B, intuitively represents the set of (dependent) 
pairs of elements of A and B (B may be dependent on elements of A): 
{(a. b)(aEA, bEB(a)}. 
Elements of Cx: A. B can be analyzed by using the two projections: 
n,(a, b) = a and n,(a, 6) = b. 
The basic idea of using strong sums to express abstract structures is best 
explained through an example. In a type system like constructions, one 
postulates a (concrete) theory by assuming a context. For example, an 
arbitrary semigroup may be introduced by postulating the following 
context: 
X: Type,, 3: x+x+x, PI PASS, 
where an arbitrary type X stands for the carrier, 0 for the binary operation 
over X, and p is an assumed proof of the axiom of associativity PASS = 
ZZx, y, z : X. (x 0 (y 0 z) = (x 0 y) 0 z). When a large proof uses many theories, 
which may depend on one and another in various ways, some notion of 
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“modularization” is needed to control the complexity. This is analogous to 
the need for modules in programming in the large. 
The strong sum is a basic adequate mechanism to solve this problem, for 
it can be used to express abstract structures. For example, if strong sum is 
available, we can express an abstract theory of semigroups as consisting of 
two parts: 
x-i; 
an (abstract) signature presentation Sig-SG = CX: Typeo. X -+ 
. the (abstract) axiom which is a map Ax-SG which, when given 
any structure s of type SiggSG, returns the associativity axiom for s. 
Furthermore, these two parts of the semigroup abstraction can be 
“packaged” together as 
SG = Cs:Sig-SG.Ax-SG(s). 
Then, to postulate an arbitrary semigroup is just to assume a context 
sg:SG. The projection operators can be used to extract the components of 
any semigroup (i.e., an object of type SG). Such a facility of expressing 
abstract structures, combined with the power of the type hierarchy, allows 
us to develop a nice approach to structured abstract reasoning (Section 4). 
However, there is a technical difficulty in extending the calculus of con- 
structions by strong sums. That is, adding type-indexed strong sums (i.e., 
Cx:A. P with A being a type and P a proposition) directly to the proposi- 
tion level of the calculus of constructions results in a logically inconsistent 
system in which Girard’s paradox can be derived (Coquand, 1986a; Hook 
and Howe, 1986; Mitchell and Harper, 1988). As propositions play an 
essential role in expressing mathematical problems (e.g., Ax-SG(s) in SG), 
this difficulty appears serious and prevents people from directly extending 
constructions by strong sums to express abstract structures. We solve it by 
lifting propositions as types (see the following explanations). 
The infinite type hierarchy in ECC is similar to that presented in 
Coquand (1986a) (and that of Martin-Lof’s (1973, 1984) type theory), but 
is fully cumulative in the following sense. First, unlike the original presenta- 
tions of the calculi of constructions (Coquand and Huet, 1988; Coquand, 
1985, 1986a), the propositions at the lowest impredicative level are lifted as 
higher-level types (of their proofs). This lifting is essential for Z-types in 
ECC to play their role as an abstraction mechanism, and it solves the 
technical difficulty mentioned above. Second, type inclusions between the 
type universes are coherently expanded to the other types so that a strong 
form of type unicity is achieved; this yields a simple notion of principal type 
and a simple algorithm for type inference. 
ECC has good proof-theoretic properties. Particularly, it is strongly 
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normalizing, which shows the proof-theoretic consistency of ECC (and, in 
general, constructions with infinite type universes) and establishes the 
theoretical basis of an implementation (e.g., decidability of convertibility 
and type checking). 
We give in this paper an (intuitionistic) set-theoretic semantics of ECC 
in the framework of o-sets (Moggi, 1985; Longo and Moggi, 1988; Hyland, 
1987) which captures the intuitive meaning of the constructs in the calculus 
and reflects its essential properties. In addition to its importance in better 
understanding the calculus, such a model-theoretic semantics seems useful 
when considering pragmatics of the calculus, e.g., how to adequately 
formalize mathematical problems in the calculus. 
In Section 2, ECC is described and its main meta-theoretic properties are 
briefly discussed. Section 3 describes th w-Set model. One of the pragmatic 
aspects of ECC-theory abstraction-is discussed in Section 4. As a 
conclusion, Sections 5 and 6 discuss some related work and further 
research topics. 
2. ECC 
ECC consists of an underlying term calculus and a set of rules for 
inferring judgements. 
2.1. The Term Calculus 
The basic expressions of the term calculus, called terms, are inductively 
defined by the following clauses: 
l The constants Prop and Typei (je o), called kinds, are terms; 
l Variables (x, u,...) are terms; 
l If M, N, and A are terms, so are the following: 
I7x:M.N, Rx:M.N, MN, Zx:M.N, pair,(M, N), n,(M), q(M). 
In Z7x:M. N, Zx:M. N, and Ix:M. N, the free occurrences of variable x in 
N (but not those in M) are bound by the binding operators l7x, Cx, and 
Ax, respectively. Terms which are the same up to changes of bound 
variables are identified. (= is used for the syntactic identity between 
expressions such as terms.) For a term A4, Z+‘(M) is the set of free 
variables occurring in M. When x & FV(N), Zlx : M. N and Cx : M. N can be 
abbreviated as A4 + N and M x N, respectively. 
Reduction (c’) and conversion (2: ) are defined as usual with respect to 
the following one-step contraction schemes: 
(PI (Ix:A.M)Nc>, [N/x]M 
(0) QpairA(M1, Ml))‘>1 Mi (i= 1, 2), 
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where [N/x]M, the substitution of term N for the free occurrences of 
variable x in M, is defined as usual with possible changes of bound 
variables. 
The kinds are also called type universes. Every kind is assigned a number 
as its level: 
Y(Prop) =df- 1 and 
The type inclusions between the universes induce the type cumulativity that 
is syntactically characterized by the following relation. 
DEFINITION 2.1 (Cumulativity relation). Let <i (i E o) be the binary 
relations over terms inductively defined as follows: 
1. A +, B if and only if one of the following holds: 
(a) A-B;or 
(b) A ~1: Prop and B N Type, for some j E o; or 
(c) A 2: Tvpe, and B N Type, for some j < k. 
2. A =$i+ 1 B if and only if one of the following holds: 
(a) A=&B; or 
(b) A=Z7x:A,.A, and B2:Z7x:B1.Bz for some A,-B, and 
A,$i B,; or 
(c) A=Z.x:A,.A, and BzZx:B,.BZ for some A,<iB, and 
A,<iBZ. 
Define the cumulativity relation < as 
d =df u d, 
IEW 
Furthermore, A < B if and only if A < B and A q+ B. 
Remark. It can be proved, by using the Church-Rosser theorem 
(Theorem 2.2), that the cumulativity relation < is the smallest binary 
relation over terms such that 
1. 4 is a partial order with respect to conversion; that is, (1) if 
AzB, then A=$B, (2)if A<B and B$A, then A-B, and (3)if A,IB 
and B,iC, then A<C; 
2. Prop< Typeo< Type, < . . . . 
3. if A, EB, and A,<B,, then Ric:A,.A,<l7x:B,.B,; 
4. if A,=$BB, and A,<B,, then ,Ex:A,.A,<Zx:B,.B,. 
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2.2. Judgements and Inference Rules 
We now describe the judgement form and the inference rules of ECC. 
Contexts are finite sequences of expressions of the form x:M, where x is 
a variable and M is a term. The empty context is denoted by ( ). The set 
of free variables in a context r z .x1 :A, ,..., x, : A,, is defined as FV(T) =df 
ul<i<n(c4 ~f-W;)). 
Judgements are of the form 
I- bM:A, 
where r is a context, and M and A are terms. The intuitive meaning is that 
M has type A in context r. We write kM:A for ( ) t M:A. 
The inference rules of ECC are listed as follows, where K and K’ stand 
for arbitrary kinds, i, j, and k for natural numbers and Y(K) for the level 
of kind K: 
(Ax) t Prop : Tvpe, 
(Cl 
CT) 
(oar) 
I-tA:K 
r, x : A t Prop : Type,, 
b 4 wm 
r /- Prop : Type0 
r I- TYPej : TYPej + 1 
r, x:A, r’ t Prop: Type0 
T,x:A, z-1 t-x:A 
(fll) 
r, x:A t P:Prop 
rtl7x:A.P:Prop 
(n2) 
TtA:KT,x:A kB:Typej 
rtIZx:A.B:Type, 
(k=max{T(K),j)) 
(1) 
r,x:AtM:BI-,x:AtB:K 
I-kLx:A.M:llx:A.B 
(w) 
TtM:Ilx:A.BrtN:A’ 
r t MN: [N/x] B 
(A’=CA) 
w 
TtA:KT,x:A kB:K’ 
TtZx:A.B:Type, 
(k = max{O, 9’(K), Y(K’)}) 
(pair) 
l-/-M:A’rtN:B’r,x:A tB:K 
r/--pair,,,,.,(M, N):L’x:A.B 
(A’=$ A, B’< [M/x] B) 
(nl) 
r t- M:L’x:A.B 
r t-zl(M):A 
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(7Q) 
I- f-M:L’x:A.B 
I- k QV: C~,MWxlB 
(conu) 
rkM:Al-tA’:K 
i-k M:A’ 
(A N A’) 
(cum) 
I’/--M:ATkA’:K 
r/--M:A’ 
(A <A’). 
A derivation of a judgement J is a finite sequence of judgements J,,..., J, 
with J, G J such that, for all 1 < i < n, Ji is the conclusion of some instance 
of an inference rule whose premises are in {J,I j< i]. A judgement J is 
derivable if there is a derivation of J. 
We shall write r 1 M:A for “r t- M:A is derivable.” We also often 
abbreviate r t- Prop: Type0 as “r is valid.” In fact, besides asserting that 
Prop has type Type,,, r k Prop: Type0 also plays the role in the calculus of 
asserting that r is a valid context. 
A term M is called a r-term (or well-typed term under r) if r t M: A for 
some A. A term A is called a r-type if r k A : K for some kind K. A r-type 
A is called a r-proposition if r k A’:Prop for some A’ ‘v A and called a 
proper r-type otherwise. 
This completes our formal presentation of the calculus. The next section 
contains some informal remarks on design decisions. 
2.3. Remarks 
ECC is a natural combination of Coquand-Huet’s (1988) calculus of 
constructions and Martin-Liif’s (1973) type theory with universes. It 
extends the calculus of constructions by adding C-types and a cumulative 
type hierarchy. It can also be seen as an extension of the core of Martin- 
Liif’s type theory with universes by adding a lowest impredicative level of 
propositions which stand for logical formulas by the Curry-Howard 
principle of formulas-as-types (Curry and Feys, 1958; Howard, 1980). 
The type universes provide us very rich type structures and make it 
possible to formalize the notion of arbitrary set by reflection principle- 
a basis to formalize abstract mathematics (e.g., abstract algebras and 
categories). Intuitively viewing types as sets and “:” as the membership 
relation, we have 
Prop E Type0 E Type, E . . (by (AxI and (T)) 
Prop c Type0 E Type, c . . . (by (cum)) 
In particular, unlike the original presentations of the calculi of construc- 
tions (Coquand and Huet, 1988; Coquand, 1985, 1986a), propositions are 
rifted to higher-level types (Prop c Typeo). It might appear that this would 
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propagate the impredicativity at the level of propositions to the higher 
levels. For instance, we can derive k IIx : Type,lirB : Typei -+ Prop. Bx : 
Typei. However, the type hierarchy, except the lowest level Prop, is still 
stratified (predicative) in the sense that the types can be ranked in such a 
way that the existence of any proper type depends only on the existence of 
types with lower ranks. This stratification of the type hierarchy is essential 
for the logical consistency of the calculus. (A more detailed analysis of this 
can be found in Luo, 1989b.) 
The idea of lifting propositions to higher-level types is very important. 
(Philosophically, it is natural to think of propositions as types but not vice 
versa.) It is essential for C-types in ECC to be useful as an abstraction tool 
to express abstract mathematical theories and program specifications, since 
adding (type-indexed) C-types to the impredicative level of Constructions 
would produce an inconsistent system in which Girard’s paradox can be 
derived (Coquand, 1986a; Hook and Howe, 1986; Mitchell and Harper, 
1988). Note that, in ECC, Xx:A. P is nor a proposition even when P is. 
However, as propositions are lifted, we have 
rkA:Type,r,x:A kP:Prop 
rt--Zx:A.P:Type, 
This Cx : A. P intuitively represents the set of pairs of an element a of A and 
a proof of the proposition p(a), i.e., the intuitionistic subset type (cf. 
Martin-Lof, 1984). It is this property that enables propositions to be 
used to express abstract axioms and program properties in abstract 
mathematical theories (see Section 4) and program specifications expressed 
as C-types. 
The type hierarchy is fully cumulative. The inference rule (cum) is a 
design decision which achieves a strong form of type unicity so that 
there is a simple notion of principal type (Theorem 2.5) and a very 
straightforward algorithm for type inference (Theorem 2.9) (Luo, 1989a, 
1989b). The other presentations in the literature of type universes with 
universe inclusions like those in (Martin-Lof, 1984; Coquand, 1986a) do 
not have this property: although every well-typed term has a minimum 
type, it is sometimes not the most general one (Luo, 1988b). For example, 
for the system presented on page 235 in Coquand (1986a), it is easy to 
show by induction on derivations that x: Type0 + Type0 tj x: Type0 --) 
Type 1. 
The pairs are “heavily typed” to avoid undesirable type ambiguity which 
would make type inference and type-checking difficult (perhaps impossible) 
(Luo, 1988a). For example, if untyped pairs were used, the untyped pair 
( T’peo, Prop) would have both Cx : Type, .x and Type, x Type0 as its types 
which are incompatible. But note that in ECC, thanks to the full 
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cumulativity of types, we still have as expected, say t-pair,,,,,, T,,Peo 
(Tym, Prop) : Type2 x Type,. 
The cumulativity relation < in Definition 2.1 is not completely con- 
travariant for 17: for l7x:A i .A, to be less than or equal to Z7x:B,. B,, A, 
is required to be convertible to B, instead of B, <A,. One may take the 
latter decision and the proof-theoretic properties will still hold. The only 
difference from the proof-theoretic point of view is that some terms would 
get more types. For example, Ax: Type, .x would not only have types 
Type, -+ Type,, but have Prop -+ Type, and Type0 + T.ypej (ja 1) as its 
types as well. However, semantically, the type inclusions thus defined 
would be reflected by coercions instead of by set inclusions. 
Finally, we note that the inference rules presented in this paper are 
slightly different from those in (Luo, 1989a). The presentation here enjoys 
the property that the use of rule (cum) can be postponed (Lemma 3.10) 
which helps to give a good definition of the model by induction on 
derivations, while the presentation in op cit. is simpler. However, the two 
presentations are derivably equivalent. 
2.4. Main Meta-Theoretic Properties 
ECC has good meta-theoretic properties. Restricted by space, we only 
briefly describe the main properties. First, the Church-Rosser property 
holds for the term calculus described in 2.1. 
THEOREM 2.2 (Church-Rosser theorem). Zf M, N M,, then there exists 
M such that M, c- M and M, D M. 
ProoJ Similar to that in Martin-L6f (1972). See (Luo, 1989b.) 1 
Remark. The inclusion of either q-reduction or the rule for surjective 
pairing would make Church-Rosser fail (van Daalen, 1980; Klop, 1980) for 
the untyped term calculus. In fact, with either of these rules, Church- 
Rosser even fails for well-typed terms of ECC because of the existence of 
type inclusions induced by universes. 
We now state some basic properties of the calculus whose proofs can be 
found in Luo (1989b) (also see Luo, 1988b). 
THEOREM 2.3, In ECC, we have 
1. Any derivation of r, x : A, r’ k M: B has a sub-derivation of 
r k A : K for some kind K. 
2 (Context validity). Any derivation of r, r’ k M: A has a sub-deriva- 
tion of r k Prop: Typeo. 
3 ( Weakening). Zf r t- M: A and r’ is a valid context which contains 
every component of r, then r’ k M: A. 
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4 (Context replacement). If r, x: A, r’ k M: C and B$ A is a F-type, 
then r, x:B, r’ k M:C. 
5 (Cut). If r, x:A, r’ t N:B and rt M:A, then r, [M/X] r’ t 
[M/x]N:[M/x]B. 
6. If r t- M: A, then A is a F-type. 
7 (Subject reduction). Zf F t- M: A and MD N, then F k N: A. 
8 (Strengthening). Zf r, y : Y, r’ t M: A and y $ FV(M) u FV(A ) u 
FV(F’), then r, r’ 1 M: A. 
9 (Type cumulativity). Let A and B be r-types. Then, A =$ B if and 
only tf r, x : A t-- x : B, where x # FV(F). 
Because of the type inclusions induced by type universes, type unique- 
ness (up to conversion) fails. However, we have a simple notion of 
principal type which characterizes the set of types of a well-typed term. 
DEFINITION 2.4 (Principal type). A is called a principal type of M (under 
r) if and only if 
1. FkM:A, and 
2. for any term A’, r t M: A’ if and only if A =$ A’ and A’ is a 
r-type. 
THEOREM 2.5 (Existence of principal type). Every r-term M has a 
principal type under F, denoted as T,(M); T,(M) is the minimum type of 
M under r with respect to the cumulativity relation <. 
Proof. The theorem follows from the properties 6 and 9 of Theorem 2.3 
and the “diamond property” of the cumulativity relation: r t- M: A and 
rt-M:Bimplies rtM:Cfor some C$A,B. 1 
Remark. The principal type T,-(M) is obviously unique (up to conver- 
sion). The existence of the principal type is not only a good proof-theoretic 
property but allows simple implementation of the type hierarchy for ECC. 
THEOREM 2.6 (Strong normalization). ECC is strongly normalizing, i.e., 
tf r t- M: A, then M is strongly normalizable. 
Remark. This result shows the proof-theoretic consistency of construc- 
tions with infinite type universes and establishes the theoretical foundation 
of an implementation. The proof is quite difficult. It uses Girard-Tait’s 
reducibility method (Girard, 1972; Tait, 1975) and is based on the proofs 
of strong normalization for the pure calculus of constructions by Coquand 
(1986b) and Pottinger (1987). One of the special key points of this proof 
is to find a suitable ranking of the types to make explicit the predicativity 
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of the type universes Typej. We do this by proving a quasi-normalization 
theorem which enables us to define a two-dimensional ranking measure. 
Details and analysis of this will appear in a paper in preparation (also see 
Luo (1989b, 1988b)). 
COROLLARY 2.7 (Consistency). ECC is logically consistent. In particular, 
for any term M, PM: 17x : Pr0p.x. 
Remark. The consistency of the calculus also follows from our model 
construction (Theorem 3.11) or even a proof-irrelevant model-theoretic 
argument (cf., Coquand, 1989) which are easier than proving normaliza- 
tion. 
COROLLARY 2.8 (Decidability of conversion). It is decidable whether 
M N N for arbitrary well-typed terms M and N. 
As the convertibility for well-typed terms is decidable, so is the 
cumulativity relation <. Hence, we have 
THEOREM 2.9 (Type inference). There is a simple algorithm such that, 
when given a context Z and a term M, it checks whether M is a Z-term, and 
tf so, returns the principal type of M under Z. 
COROLLARY 2.10 (Decidability of type-checking). ECC is decidable, i.e., 
it is decidable whether Z k M:A for arbitrary Z, M, and A. 
3. AN O-SET MODEL OF ECC 
In this section, we construct a realizability model of ECC which gives an 
(intuitionistic) set-theoretic semantics of the calculus. The model captures 
the intuitive meanings of the constructs in the calculus and reflects its 
essential properties such as logical consistency. It also gives some hints on 
how abstract mathematics may be adequately formalized. 
3.1. Basic Ideas and Basic Notions 
The main question in interpreting ECC set-theoretically is how to inter- 
pret the type universes and the type formation operators l7 and Z so that, 
intuitively, 
1. Prope TypeoE Type, E . . . . 
2. Props Type,E Type, c . . . . 
3. Typei is closed under I7 and C; 
4. Prop is closed under II. 
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These requirements prevent us from giving a naive non-trivial classical 
set-theoretic model of ECC. (See Reynolds, 1984; Reynolds and Plotkin, 
1988; Longo and Moggi, 1988; Pitts, 1987; Coquand et al., 1987; Meseguer, 
1988, for discussions for modeling the second-order I-calculus (Girard, 
1986; Reynolds, 1974) which is a sub-system of ECC.) 
Fortunately, the idea of interpreting types as partial equivalence 
relations (Girard, 1972; Troelstra, 1973; Moggi, 1985) provides us a nice 
framework of o-sets and modest sets (Moggi, 1985; Longo and Moggi, 
1988; Hyland, 1987) in which there is an interpretation of ECC satisfying 
the above requirements. In particular, proper types can be interpreted as 
o-sets and propositions as objects of a full subcategory PROP of the 
category of o-sets which is isomorphic to the category of partial equiv- 
alence relations. The lowest impredicative universe (Prop) corresponds to 
the category PROP and the predicative universes ( Typej) correspond to 
large set universes. (This idea of interpreting Type, as large set universes is 
suggested to the author by Hayashi, Moggi, and Coquand.) 
The rest of this subsection is devoted to the basic notions of w-sets and 
modest sets, and to the basic ideas for interpreting ECC in order to satisfy 
the requirements mentioned above. In fact, the basic framework is slightly 
extended in order to gain a good interpretation of the type hierarchy. 
DEFINITION 3.1 (o-sets). An w-set A= (/AI, IFA) consists of a (carrier) 
set IAl and a binary (realizability) relation 1 t--A c w  x IAl such that 
‘due lAl.3n~w.n Ik,z, a. 
A morphism f between two o-sets A and B is a function f: IAl + I BI such 
that 3n E o.n I tA,B S, where (with nm denoting the result of Kleene 
application of n to m) 
n IkA.Bfif and only if VaelAI Vm~co.m IFA a*nm ItBf(a). 
The w-sets and the morphisms between them form the category of w-sets, 
denoted as o-Set. 
The category of o-sets, and the category of modest sets delined below, 
are concrete locally Cartesian closed categories (Moggi, 1985; Longo and 
Moggi, 1988; Hyland, 1987). We now define three o-set constructors u, c,-, 
and 7~~ which will be used as basic operations to interpret valid contexts, 
C-types and &types in our model, respectively. 
DEFINITION 3.2 (a, d,-, and z~). Suppose that r is an o-set and 
A : I fJ + o-Set. 
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(a) a(T, A) is defined to be the o-set: 
btr? A)/ =df {h a) 17 E irt, a E IA(r)1 > 
(m,n> Il- ocr,AJ (Y, a) if and only if m I kr Y and n I kacrj a. 
(Do) Let B:lo(I’, A)J -*w-Set. o,(A, B) is the function from (I-1 to 
w-Set defined as, for y E Ir/, 
bdA, B)(y)l =df ((% b, t aE IA(r)/, b E lB(% u)i > 
Cm, n > I tor~A.Bj(y, (a, b) if and only if m ) t---A(y) a and n ) bB(y,rrJ b 
(nr) Let B: [a(& A)/ + o-Set. n,(A, B) is the function from Irl to 
w-Set defined as, for YE (r(, (rc,(A, B)(y)1 is the set of the functions 
fi MY)I + UaeIAcyjl IBh 41 such that 
vu~ IA( .f(a) E Mr, a)l and In em.12 I l-KrcA,B,cgjf 
and n (tnr(a.BI(rI f if and only if 
Large set universes are used to interpret the predicative universes Typei 
so that the closedness requirement 3 is satisfied. A basic insight is that the 
notions of o-sets and modest sets have nothing to do with sizes of the sets 
under consideration. Consider ZFC set theory with infinite inaccessible car- 
dinals rcO < x1 < . . . (recall that a cardinal ti is (strongly) inaccessible if it 
is uncountable and regular, and 2” <K for all A < K. See, e.g., Levy, 1979; 
Devlin, 1979) and let V, be the cumulative hierarchy of sets. Then Typei 
is interpreted to correspond to the following category o-Set(j). 
DEFINITION 3.3. w-Set(j) is the full subcategory of o-Set whose objects 
are those w-sets whose carrier sets are in VM,. 
As VK, is a model of ZFC set theory, we have 
LEMMA 3.4. or and nr are closed for w-Set(j), that is, if A: Ir( -+ 
o-Set(j) and B:lo(I’, A)/ -+ o-Set(j), then o,(A, B), nr,(A, B):JTI + 
o-Set(j). 
Remark. The above lemma meets the closedness requirement 3. As 
VK, E v,,+,, o-Set(j) is a full subcategory of o-Set(j+ l), satisfying the 
inclusion requirement 2 between the Typej. Note that o-Set(j) are small 
categories. Therefore, they can be naturally viewed as w-sets through the 
embedding functor A from the category of sets Set to o-Set defined as 
A(X) =df (X, o x X) for XE Obj(Set), and A(f) =&f forf: X+ Yin Set. As 
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VK,E Kc,+,’ we have d(Obj(o-Set(j))) E Obj(w-Set(j+ 1)). This satisfies the 
membership requirement 1 between the Type,. 
To interpret the propositions, the notion of modest set is essential, as the 
category of modest sets M is closed for arbitrary products. 
DEFINITION 3.5 (Modest sets). A modest set is an w-set A such that 
VIEW, Va,b~lAl, n IkAa and II Ik,b=~-a=6. 
The category of modest sets, denoted as M, is the full subcategory of o-Set 
with the modest sets as its objects. 
LEMMA 3.6. x,- is closed for the modest sets in the sense that, for all 
A: Irl +o-Set, B: la(T, A)1 -+ M, we have n,(A, B): IZJ -+ M. 
Proof. See Longo and Moggi (1988). u 
Unlike the case of models (e.g., Longo and Moggi, 1988) of the second- 
order lambda calculus, where the only universe is itself not a type, although 
M is closed for arbitrary products as the above lemma shows it cannot be 
directly used to interpret the impredicative universe Prop in constructions- 
like calculi. The reason is that M itself is not a small category. If Prop were 
interpreted as M, there would be no way to justify Prop E Typeo. For- 
tunately, M is a smaZ1 complete category in the sense that it is equivalent 
to the following small category PROP, which is isomorphic to the category 
of partial equivalence relations over o. (Recall that R is a partial equiv- 
alence relation if R is symmetric and transitive.) 
DEFINITION 3.7 (PROP). The category PROP is the full subcategory of 
M (hence, of o-Set) with the object set 
Obj(PROP) =df {(Q(R), ~1 I R - c 0 x 0 is a partial equivalence relation}, 
where, Q(R) = { [nlRl (n, n) E R} is the quotient set with respect to R. 
LEMMA 3.8. There is an equivalence of categories back:M --f PROP such 
that back(A) g A for A E Obj(M), and back(P) = P for PE Obj(PROP). 
Proof: Define back:M --) PROP as follows: for A E Obj(M), 
baCk(d)=df (Q(RA), E) 
whereR,={(n,m)~3a~A.n~~~~andm(~-,a}isthepartialequivalence 
relation induced by A, and, for any morphism f: A -+ B in M, 
back(f I( [PI RA) =df C~PI RBT where n IkA.Bft 
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back is a category equivalence with the inclusion functor inc:PROP + M 
as its inverse. In fact, we have the identity natural transformation 
id: id,,,, --t back 0 inc and a natural transformation 
r] : idM -+ inc 0 back 
defined as follows: for AtzObj(M) and a~/Al, qA(u)=,,[n],,, where 
n 11, a. Hence, for all A E Obj(M), back(A) = into back(A) E A. Further- 
more, for P = (Q(R), E) E Obj(PROP), it is easy to show that R, = R, and 
so back(P)= (Q(Rr), E) = (Q(R), E) = P. 1 
Remark. Prop is interpreted to correspond to the category PROP. The 
existence of the equivalence back is important to satisfy the closedness 
requirement 4 as M is closed under rcr. The requirement Prop E Type0 is 
satisfied by the fact that PROP is a full subcategory of o-Set(O) and, the 
requirement Prop E Type0 by the fact d(Obj(PROP)) E Obj(o-Set(O)). 
3.2. Model Construction 
We give every valid context and every derivable judgement a unique 
denotation such that they satisfy some desirable properties. A valid context 
is interpreted as an o-set and a derivable judgement r t- M:A as a 
“T-indexed element of A.” 
Notation (FPP propery). Let ro o-Set and A: ITI + o-Set. A 
morphism f P-, a(T’, A) in o-Set satisfies the first projection (FPP) 
property, written as 
if and only if p(I’, A) 0 f = id,-, where p(I’, A):o(I’, A) + r is the morphism 
defined by p(P’, A)(y, a) =df y. Intuitively, f:r+FPP a(r, A) is a “T-indexed 
element of A.” 
THEOREM 3.9 (Interpretation). There is an interpretation 1-1 of the valid 
contexts and the derivable judgements of ECC such that 
1. if r k Prop: TypeO, then [IJ E Obj(u-Set); 
2. ifrt--M:A, then [rkM:Aa:[I’J -+FPP [yr,x:Alj; 
3. if A < A’ are r-types, then there is an inclusion morphism 
inc,(A, A’):[r, x:AJ C. [I’,x:A’I] such that, zfT/--M:A, rj-N:A’ and 
MEN, then [r/-N:A’I]=inc,(A,A’)o[Tf-M:A]. 
Before defining the interpretation, we discuss a notational convention 
and a notion of canonical derivation. First, different from the traditional 
simpler cases (cf., Seely, 1984), types and objects in constructions-like 
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calculi are mixed up. Types are also objects with kinds as their types. 
Therefore, a type has a “double identity” in the model, playing slightly 
different roles when viewed as a type or as an object. This is reflected 
technically as a correspondence between functions and a special kind of 
morphisms in o-Set. 
Convention. Suppose l-c o-Set and K: (ZJ + w-Set is a constant func- 
tion such that, for some set X, K(y) =d(X)= (X, ox X) for all YE Irl. 
Then, there is a one-one correspondence between the morphisms from f to 
a(T, K) which satisfy the first projection property and the functions from 
II-1 to x. 
9 Given f:r-,FPP cr(T, K), the corresponding function f * : (rl + X is 
defined by f*(y)=dfx, where YE Ir( and f(y)=(y,x); 
l Given g: IZJ 4 X, the corresponding morphism g’:T-+ FPP a(T, K) 
is defined by go(y) =df (y, ?c), where y E IZJ and g(y) = zc. 
We have, f *' = f and go* = g. Based on this, we shall in the proof below 
of Theorem 3.9 adopt the convention that we omit * and ’ for convenience. 
Second, we introduce a notion of canonical derivation in order to give 
a good inductive definition of the interpretation. As pointed out by 
Coquand (1989), it is a nice meta-theoretic property for a calculus that a 
judgement have at most one derivation (up to conversion). The work by 
Streicher (1988) shows that this property is very helpful, and sometimes 
necessary, to define a semantics by induction on derivations. When a 
calculus lacks such a property, a definition of semantics may assign 
different denotations to the same judgement. Streicher (1988) gives a way 
of solving this problem, first defining denotations by induction on the 
structure of pre-judgements (instead of on derivations), and then proving 
that the definition gives a unique denotation to every derivable judgement. 
It is obvious that our presentation of ECC does not have the property 
that every judgement has at most one derivation because the universe 
inclusions induce general inclusions between types (rule (cum)). However, 
because of the existence of principal types, we can introduce a notion of 
canonical derivation which exists for every derivable judgement. The essen- 
tial idea is to postpone all of the uses of the (cum) rule to the last step. The 
existence of canonical derivations enables us to construct the model by 
induction on canonical derivations. 
LEMMA 3.10 (Postponing (cum)). In ECC, every derivable judgement has 
a derivation in which rule (cum) is not used except in the last step. 
Proof By induction on derivations. m 
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An immediate consequence of the above lemma is that every derivable 
judgement has a derivation J, ,..., .I, such that J, ,..., .I,- r are all of the form 
r k M: T,(M) and J, is deduced by rule (conu) or (cum). We call a deriva- 
tion of this form a canonical derivation. Note that the canonical derivations 
of a judgement are essentially the same (up to conversion). Furthermore, 
all judgements in a canonical derivation of a judgement of the form 
r’ tlv: T,.(N) have the form r t--M: T,-(M). Now, we return to prove 
Theorem 3.9 and define the model. 
Proof of Theorem 3.9. An interpretation satisfying the stated properties 
is defined by induction on the length of the shortest canonical derivations 
of a judgement. 
First, we interpret valid contexts. Recall that a context r is valid if and 
only if r j- Prop: Type0 is derivable. By rule (Ax), the empty context is 
valid. It is interpreted as the terminal object of o-Set: 
cc >n=dfl=(L@xl). 
A valid context r, x:A (by rule (C)) is interpreted as the o-set 
56 x:4 =df45rll, erwK4). 
Note that the interpretation of a kind (see below) is an FPP-morphism 
corresponding to a constant function. By the convention we discussed 
above, [r, x:A] is well defined. (We will not detail such correctness claims 
below but leave them to the reader.) 
The derivable judgements are interpreted by considering the last rule 
used in canonical derivations: 
(Ax)(C) r t- Prop : Type0 is interpreted as 
ur k Prop: Tweil(y) =df b, 4Obj(PROP))), 
where y E I [TIJ 1 and A is the embedding functor from Set to w-Set. 
(T) r t- Qpej: Type,, 1 is interpreted as, for y E ) 5flI, 
iv k TyPj: T’.Pj+ d(y)=d[(y, A(Obj(o-Set(j)))). 
(var) Define [I’, x:A, r’ /- x:A] to be the function with domain 
I5c x:4 rm by 
ur, X:A, r’ !-~:Anh ~1, Y’)=df ((Y, a, $1, 4. 
(ZIl) r kIik:A.P:Prop is interpreted as 
[yr~-x:A.P:Prop~=,,back~nll~(i[rtA:T,(A)~, [r,x:A kP:Prop]), 
where back is the category equivalence defined in the proof of Lemma 3.8. 
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(Z72) r ~ZZx:A.B:Type, is interpreted as 
i[rt-&:A.B:Type,] =dfn:iIn([rtA:Kj, [r,x:A kB:Type,l). 
(,I) There are two cases to consider. 
1. rtjLfx:A.B:Prop. Then, for y~l[fll, 
[f-~lwx:A.M:I7x:A.B](y)=,,(y, g,), 
where, supposing P = 71 lin ( fr /- A : T,(A)], [L’, x : A k B : 
T,,,,(B)]), g, E /P(y)1 is the function such that, if 
[r, x:A k M: B](y, a) = ((y, a), b), then g,(a) = b. 
2. rkZ7x:A.B:Prop. Then, for y~l[I’Jl, 
i[r~nx:A.M:nx:A.B11(~)=,,(~, rlpcy,(g,)), 
where P and g, are as in the above case and u is the natural 
transformation defined in the proof of Lemma 3.8. 
(app) There are two cases to consider: 
1. r,x:A/+B:Prop.Then,fory~I[flI,if[Irt--M:I7x:A.B](y)= 
(y,f) and Irk N:A’l(y) = (Y, ~1, then 
iTrtMN:CN/xlBn(Y)=,,(Y,f(a)). 
2. T,x:AkB:Prop. Then, for y~J[rljJ, if [rl-M:Z7x:A.B] 
(Y) = (Y, Cnl R[r+mr A B:Tr("r,4 B,3(y,)' Tr t- N:A'D(y) = (Y, a) and 
P l!-~r~a:Tm~y~ a, then 
tr 1 MN: CN/xlBn(Y) =df (Y, ~‘IR,~,.~ A+s.rr.r:A,B)TI(:.,a,), 
where the R’s are the partial equivalence relations as defined in 
the proof of Lemma 3.8. 
(C) r b Cx : A. B: Typek is interpreted as 
[rkCx:A.B:Type,] =dfb[,-J([T,-A:fl, [r,x:A tB:K’j). 
(pair) ForyEI[al,if [[rkM:A’](y)=(y,m)and ([rl-N:B’](y)= 
(Y, nh 
lI~~pairZ.~:a.B(M N):zx:A.Bn(Y)=df(Y, h n)). 
(7cl)(rr2) For y~I[flI, if [rkM:Cx:A.B](y)=(y, (a, b)), then 
~rkn,(M):An(y)=df (Y? a) 
hr~712(M):CN/XlBn(Y)=df(Y, b). 
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(cow) Define [f l--M:A’] as [r k M:A]. 
(cum) r 1 M:A’ is interpreted as, for y E 1 [J’J (, 
urt-M:A’acY,=,,ur~M:An(Y). 
It can be verified that the interpretation satisfies the conditions stated in 
the theorem. Here, we explain how substitution is understood semantically 
and verify that the interpretation preserves conversion. Suppose that 
rtN:A and ZY,x:At-M:B. The judgement r~[N/.x]M:[N/x]B is 
interpreted as the “composition” of their interpretations; that is, for 
~ElUrlll, if 
Ur,x:A t-M:BD(UTtN:AIJ(y))=((y,a),h) 
then 
%r I- CN/xlM: CNlxl W(v) = (~3 6). 
To verify the preserveness of the convertibility, by the Church-Rosser 
theorem and subject reduction, we only have to show that if r t M: A and 
Mb, N, then [r /- M:AJ = [r k N: Al]. In other words, we only have to 
show that 
[Z- l- (Ilx:A.M)N: [N/x] Bl = [r t- [N/x]M: [N/x] BJj 
and, let Pr pair,:,,.(M,, M,), 
We only check the case for p-reduction when f k N:A, f, x:A k M:B, 
and r, x: A t- B: Prop. The other cases can be similarly verified. For 
y E 1 [fll, by definition, suppose 
Ur I- N:AII(Y) = (~3 a) and PII- sd(~rt A:fr(Aj](y,) a 
UC x:A t-M:Bl(y, 0) = ((~2 a), C~l~,r,,~+B p,opI,;,o,) 
Ur k ~-~:A.M:flx:A.Bll(y) = h CdR~r+nr.A 8:p,opD,J 
then, by definition, np E [mlR,r,r AbB.P,oplti,oj. So, we have 
UC-- (~~:P~~~.M)N:CN/~IBIJ(Y)=(~, Cn~l.,,.~~+~:~,~~,(~,~,) 
= (Y, Cm1 R[r.r A+B PmpDi7.a) 1 
= Qr I- ENhIM: CNlxlBIi(~h 
This completes the proof of the theorem. 1 
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3.3. Consistency and Discussions 
One of the most important features of the realizability model described 
above is that it entails the logical consistency of ECC. 
THEOREM 3.11 (Consistency). ECC is logically consistent in the sense 
that there is a proposition which is not inhabited by any term. In particular, 
for any term M, FM: Ilx : Pr0p.x. 
Proof: In fact, [ FZIx: Prop.x: Prop] is the function from the singleton 
set (*} with (*, (~3, (25)) as its image. So, there is no morphism from 
I[( )]=l to [y:k:Prop.x] =a(l, [tnx:Prop.x:Prop]).ByTheorem 3.9, 
we have pM:IIlx:Prop.x for any term M. 1 
By this theorem, the higher-order intuitionistic logic embedded in ECC 
by the CurryyHoward correspondence (Curry and Feys, 1958; Howard, 
1969) is consistent. This is the most basic requirement for ECC to be 
suitable for theorem-proving and program specification. This is one of the 
reasons that we view such a model as appropriate. There are other 
reasonable models. For example, we can give a truth-value model of ECC 
where propositions are interpreted as 0 or 1. Some other models (e.g., 
domain-theoretic ones) do not capture the essential properties of the 
calculus like logical consistency. 
Besides the consistency, the model described above gives an (intui- 
tionistic) set-theoretic semantics of the calculus. (o-sets and modest sets 
can be characterized in the framework of effective topos (Eff) (Hyland, 
1982, 1987), which is a topos-theoretic model of intuitionistic set theory.) 
The set-theoretic flavor of such a semantics makes possible a deeper under- 
standing of the calculus, and the semantics may be used as the basis of an 
informal but precise explanation for users doing theorem proving and 
program specification (e.g., Luo et al., 1989). For example, the intuitions 
that a: A means that a denotes an element of the set denoted by A, that 
P: Prop as a proposition and as a lifted type P: rvpe, denotes the same set, 
and that the syntactic type inclusions (A 5 A’) are set inclusions are all 
reflected by the model. 
Another insight one may gain from the model is about how to formalize 
mathematical problems adequate@. As we know, one of the basic motiva- 
tions for introducing type universes is to allow formalization of the notion 
of an arbitrary set by reflection (Martin-Liif, 1973; Coquand, 1989). Our 
model gives semantical support to such an idea. For example, it seems to 
be not adequate to formalize an arbitrary group by assuming its carrier by 
X:Prop, as we know that X, as a proposition, cannot be viewed as an 
arbitrary set. Assuming X: Type0 is more adequate as we can view Type0 as 
containing almost all sets as shown by the above model. More research is 
needed on this aspect. 
HIGHERCALCULUSANDTHEORYABSTRACTION 127 
4. THEORY ABSTRACTION IN ECC 
In this section, we briefly discuss a pragmatic aspect of ECC--expressing 
and structuring mathematical theories in proof development. We show 
what facilities for abstraction and modularization the calculus provides and 
how abstract reasoning and structured reasoning can be done in our set- 
ting. The idea of structuring theories in proof development was originally 
introduced to the author by Rod Burstall and the formulation in this paper 
also benefits from discussions with Coquand, Taylor, and Pollack (see 
Coquand, 1989; Luo, 1989a, Taylor and Luo, 1988). 
4.1. A Notion of (Abstract) Theory 
What is a theory? Different theory manipulation mechanisms give rather 
different impressions of what a theory might be. Here, we take a simple 
view that a theory in a proof development system basically consists of a 
signature (a group of basic notions, say constants and function symbols), 
a group of hypotheses (say axioms) and the proved theorems (possibly 
together with their proofs). 
We also conceptually distinguish concrete theories and abstract theories. 
For example, a concrete theory of natural numbers would be expressed in 
ECC as a context r,,, of the form 
nat: Type,, O:nat, suc:nat + nat, + :nat -+ nat + nat, . . . . 
where “...” contains the assumptions of the axioms for natural numbers. 
Proved theorems of such a concrete theory are then the inhabited proposi- 
tions proved under it (i.e., some P’s such that fNat t-- p : P for some p). 
More interestingly, we can express a notion of abstract theory as well by 
using X-types and the type hierarchy. For instance, as discussed in the 
Introduction, we can express the abstract theory of semigroups as the 
-Wpe, 
SGzZs:Sig-SG.Ax-SG(s), 
where Sig- SG z CX: Typeo. X +X-t X and Ax-SG(s) is the proposition 
for the associativity axiom. 
In general, a presentation of an (abstract) mathematical theory T in 
ECC consists of 
l a signature presentation Sig-T, which is in general a C-type, and 
. the abstract axioms over the signature, which can be expressed as 
a propositional function Ax-T of type Sig- T --, Prop. 
643/90/1-9 
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Then the abstract theory T is expressed by the Z-type: 
TzZs:Sig-T.Ax-T(s). 
The proved (abstract) theorems of T are expressed as a function 
9 Thm-T of type Sig- T -+ Prop, which is generally of the form 
;ls:Sig- T. P, A P, A . . . A P,, where A is the propositional AND 
operator defined in the calculus. 
The proofs of these theorems constitute a function 
l Prf- T of type Ilt : T. Thm- T(n,( t)) which, when given any 
T-structure satisfying the T-axioms, results in the (concrete) proofs of the 
theorems for the structure. 
Remark. It is easy to see that, in this setting, any abstract universal 
algebra with finitely many sorts, operators, and axioms can be formalized 
as an abstract theory. One can also formalize categorical notions in a 
similar way. 
4.2. Abstract Reasoning 
We use the phrase “abstract reasoning” here in the sense of Paulson 
(1987), where he points out its desirability and the fact that the theory 
mechanism of Cambridge LCF, which is based on ideas of Sannella and 
Burstall (1983), does not support it. The idea of abstract reasoning is that, 
instead of re-proving a theorem for many concrete theories, we can prove 
an (abstract) theorem in an (abstract) theory, then simply instantiate the 
abstract proofs as concrete ones for free. The notion of abstract theories for 
computer-assisted reasoning is analogous to the notion of “parameterized 
modules” for modular programming. It becomes more useful as the task of 
proof development becomes large. 
How this idea of abstract reasoning by proof instantiation can be 
expressed in the notion of theory we presented above is best explained by 
a simple example. Consider the abstract theory SG of semigroups and 
suppose that we have proved some (abstract) theorems about it: 
Thm-SG=Is:Sig-SG.P, A ... A P, 
Prf-SG E %sg :SG. anhintro(p, ,..., p,). 
We can then, for instance, instantiate these theorems and proofs to the 
concrete ones about natural numbers and + (or other similar concrete 
theories) whenever we have proved that the structure consisting of nut and 
+ satisfies the associativity axiom (say, with proof ass-nut-plus). The 
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instantiated proofs are then easily constructed as (from now on, we elide 
the explicitly typed pair operator for notational convenience) 
Prf-Nat-SG = Prf-SG((nat, +), ass-nat-plus). 
Remark. The facility of abstract reasoning comes from the power of 
n-abstraction. However, the type universes make it possible to formalize 
abstract mathematics (like the theory of semigroups) adequately and 
Z-types are important for “packaging” the formalization in a well- 
structured way. 
4.3. Structured Reasoning 
In larger proof development activities, one hopes to conquer a big and 
complex task by dividing it into smaller and simpler ones and then putting 
the results together in a structured way. We discuss here two aspects of this 
idea. 
4.3.1. Proof inheritance. Proof inheritance between theories through 
theory morphisms (Taylor and Luo, 1988; Coquand, 1989) allows the 
theorems and proofs of a smaller and weaker theory to be inherited as 
those of a bigger and stronger theory. 
A morphism from an (abstract) theory T to another T’ is a pair of 
functions (f; g), where 
f: Sig- T + Sig- T’ 
g:Z’Is:Sig-T.Ax- T(s) -+ Ax-T’(f(s)). 
The existence of such a morphism means that T is stronger than T’. A typi- 
cal example of such a morphism is when T (say, theory of rings) is a theory 
which contains more sorts or operators and stronger axioms than a theory 
T’ (say, SG); there is a “forgetful” morphism whose first component, J; 
forgets the extra sorts and operators and whose second component gives 
proofs of the axioms of T’ under the translation off: 
Given such a morphism, we can inherit the proofs of theorems in the 
weaker theory T’ as the proofs of the corresponding theorems in T in the 
following way. Suppose Prf-T’ is the (abstract) proofs of the theorems 
proved for T’ which is of type Z7t’: T’. Thm- T’(n,(t’)). Then, the corre- 
sponding (abstract) theorems in T 
Thm(T, T’)rAs:Sig-T.Thm-T’(f(s)) 
are proved by the following proofs inherited from Prf-T’: 
Prf(T, T’)=E.t:T.Prf-T’(f(z,(t)), g(x,(t), x2(t))). 
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For example, the theorems about semigroups can be inherited as theorems 
about rings through a forgetful morphism. (There are indeed two forgetful 
morphisms which concern the operators plus and multiplication, respec- 
tively.) The idea of divide-and-conquer (and separation of concerns) is 
embodied in proof inheritance. Simpler and more general theorems are 
dealt with in simpler and weaker theories, and then inherited (or lifted) to 
more complex and stronger theories. 
4.3.2. Sharing by parameterization. Structure sharing is important for 
modular proof development just as it is for modular programming. The 
type hierarchy of ECC provides a strong form of polymorphism and hence 
a facility of defining higher-order modules. With this, one can define func- 
tions between abstracted modules and express sharing by parameterization 
to structure proof development in the style of Pebble (Burstall, 1984; 
Lampson and Burstall, 1988) where the type of all types exists. We explain 
this by an example. 
EXAMPLE. We define a function ringGen which results in a ring struc- 
ture when given as arguments a semigroup and an abelian group with the 
same carrier, and a proof of the extra axiom (the distributive laws). 
Suppose the theories of semigroups and abelian groups are defined as 
SG z Zs:ZX: Type,.SGwrt(X).Ax-SG(s) 
AG E Eg:.ZX: Type,.AGwrt(X).Ax-AG(g) 
where SGwrt, AGwrt : Type,, + Type,, and, when given X: Type0 as carrier, 
give as results the types of the operations for semigroups and abelian 
groups with respect to X, respectively, and Ax-SG(s) and Ax-AG(g) are 
the propositions expressing the axioms of theories for semigroups and 
abelian groups. 
ringGen can then be defined as 
ringGen 3 1.X: Type0 
%*:SGwrt(X) J.p:Ax-SG(X, *) 
A( +, 0, ‘):AGwrt(X) Aq:Ax-AG(X, +, 0, ‘) 
ld:P DIsTR.((X +, 0, ', *), and-intro(p, q, 4) 
which is of type 
IIX : Type0 
lZ*:SGwrt(X) I7p:Ax-SG(X, *) 
Ilg:AGwrt(X) Z7q:Ax_AG(X, g) 
IId:P DIsTR.R~w, 
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where GISTa is the proposition for the distributive laws and Ring is the 
C-type for the abstract theory of rings defined similarly to SG and AG. 
ringGen guarantees that its two arguments have the same carrier. 
Note that SGwrt and AGwrt are sort of “parameterized modules.” Sup- 
ported by such a facility, the idea of divide-and-conquer can be successfully 
used for proof development. For example, ringGen is useful to organize 
proof inheritance when a structure can be viewed as a ring in different 
ways. When some proofs of justifying the construction of a required struc- 
ture (ring in this case) are more complicated, this is desirably useful to 
make proof development structured. 
Remark. There are several different ways to control structure sharing 
which appear in programming and specification languages ML (Harper 
et al., 1986; MacQueen, 1986), Pebble (Lampson and Burstall, 1988), and 
Clear (Burstall and Goguen, 1980) (see Burstall, 1984, for a simple 
explanation). Although propositional equality (e.g., Leibniz’s equality) can 
be defined in constructions, it cannot be used to express sharing constraints 
in the style of ML, as Thierry Coquand pointed out to the author. 
4.4. Discussion 
We have shown above that the extensions of the calculus of construc- 
tions by Z-types and type universes provide expressive mechanisms to 
express a notion of (abstract) theory for doing abstract and structured 
reasoning. These mechanisms can even be internally expressed in ECC (an 
idea due to Pollack and Coquand) (Luo, 1989); for this the fourth level of 
the type hierarchy (types of type Type,) is used. 
As well known, existential types (weak sums) (Mitchell and Plotkin, 
1985; Reynolds, 1983; Prawitz, 1965) can be defined in the calculus of con- 
structions. (They can also be defined at the predicative levels of ECC, Luo, 
1989a.) However, they are not useful to express mathematical theories or 
program specifications, because the elimination operator for the weak sum 
is too weak and, in particular, there is no way to prove that the first 
component of a “weak pair” of type 3x: A. B satisfies the property B. 
A comparison of strong and weak sums in the context of modular 
programming can be found in MacQueen (1986). 
The approach to theory abstraction discused above adopts a view of 
“theories as types.” More precisely, abstract theories are expressed as 
Z-types. There is another approach to theory structuring (Sannella and 
Burstall, 1983; Burstall and Luo, 1988) borrowing an idea from research in 
algebraic specification languages like Clear (Burstall and Goguen, 1980). 
This latter approach may be called “theories as values,” as there are theory 
operations to “put theories together.” In the AUTOMATH project, ideas 
like telescope of organizing mathematical texts through manipulating 
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contexts were informally studied (de Bruijn, 1980; Zucker, 1975) (thanks to 
a referee for referring the author to the paper, op cit.). Further research and 
experience are needed to show what is necessary and whether it is possible 
to combine these ideas together. 
5. RELATED WORK 
The calculus of constructions (CC for short) is studied in (Coquand, 
1985; Coquand and Huet, 1988, 1985) etc. Its meta theory is developed in 
Coquand (1985, 1986b) and Pottinger (1987). There are several existing 
(independent) work on the semantic aspects of constructions including the 
following. Hyland and Pitts (1987) developed a general approach to 
categorical semantics of constructions-like calculi, where an extension of CC 
with C-types and unit types is presented with the motivation of investi- 
gating semantics. Streicher (1988) studied semantics of CC based on the 
notion of contextual category (Cartmell, 1986) and raised the question of 
well-definedness of interpretations of categorical semantics. Hyland (1987) 
gives a clue how a model of CC may be constructed in the framework of 
o-sets and Ehrhard (1988) sketched an w-Set model of CC. A full descrip- 
tion of an w-Set model of CC (with z-types and lifting of propositions as 
types) can be found in Luo (1988a). In this paper, we have extended the 
model in op cit. to the type hierarchy (using an idea of Hayashi) and 
simplified it by using principal types and canonical derivations. 
Type universes are first introduced in Martin-Lof’s (1973, 1984) type 
theory and also appear in NuPRL’s type theory (Constable, 1986). The 
idea of extending the calculus of constructions by infinite universes 
appeared in Coquand (1986a), where the generalized calculus of construc- 
tions (GCC for short) is presented. The strong normalization theorem for 
constructions with infinite type universes was proved in Luo (1988b). The 
type-checking problem for GCC is considered in Harper and Pollack 
(1989); because GCC does not have the property of type unicity, the 
resulting algorithm is rather complicated compared with that for ECC 
(Luo, 1989a, 1989b; Pollack, 1989). 
X-types are well known in Martin-Lof’s (1973, 1984) type theory. A 
similar idea of using C-types to express modular structures occurs in 
researches of programming languages (e.g., Burstall and Lampson, 1984; 
MacQueen, 1986). For programming language research, one does not need 
to consider the logical consistency problem as we do. The idea of lifting 
propositions as types in constructions in order to use C-types to express 
abstract structures and mathematical theories was investigated in Luo 
(1988a, 1989b). Coquand (1989) and Streicher (1988) considered more 
explicit lifting operators to lift propositions and view the more implicit 
calculus as an abbreviation of the explicit one (Coquand, 1989). 
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6. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH TOPICS 
In this paper, the extended calculus of constructions (ECC) is presented 
and studied. It is an expressive and promising calculus for formalizing 
mathematical problems in computer-assisted reasoning and program 
specification. In particular, an w-Set realizability model is given and the 
pragmatic aspect of theory abstraction is discussed. 
By the Curry-Howard principle of formulas-as-types (Curry and Feys, 
1958; Howard, 1969), there is an embedded logic in ECC. We conjecture 
that this logic is a conservative extension (with respect to some reasonable 
interpretation) of the (intensional intuitionistic) higher-order logic HOL 
(cf., Church, 1940; Takeuti, 1975, for classical ones). This is also relevant 
to the problem of adequate formalization of abstract mathematics dis- 
cussed at the end of Section 3. The connection is concerned with the follow- 
ing question: What is a proper way of interpreting the object set in HOL? 
We conjecture that it should be interpreted as a proper type instead of a 
proposition; in other words, if the object set of individuals is interpreted as 
a proposition Obj:Prop, the interpretation will not give a conservative 
extension of HOL (the intuition is that too much computational power is 
provided at the impredicative level), and if the object set is interpreted as 
a proper type (say, Obj: Type,), it will give a conservativity result of the 
embedded logic with respect to HOL. Further research is needed in this 
aspect. (We also conjectured this in Luo, 1989a. Recently, Geuvers, 1989, 
and Berardi, 1989, have independently proved that interpreting the object 
set as a proposition in the pure calculus of constructions does not yield 
conservativity, which shows that the first part of our conjecture is right, 
while the second part is still open.) 
The proof-theoretic power of the calculus is unknown. The realizability 
model given in this paper uses large set universes to interpret the type 
universes Type,. But it may be possible to give a small model of ECC. 
Doing specilications in type theory has been studied by the Goteborg 
group (Nordstrom et al., 1990) and the NuPRL group (Constable, 1986) 
based on type theories of Martin-Lof and NuPRL. An idea called deliverables 
is recently proposed by Burstall (1989) using ECC. We view ECC as a core 
of a programming logic in whose impredicative level (Prop) the embedded 
logic resides and whose predicative levels provide programming facilities 
(cf., Leivant, 1989). Using ECC as a programming logic has certain 
advantages compared with some other type theories. For example, unlike 
Martin-Lof’s (1973, 1984) type theories, we do not need to add a new 
propositional equality in our setting since Leibniz’s equality (over any 
type A, notation = A) is definable in our calculus and, more importantly, 
it refects the computational equality (conversion) in the sense that a z b 
whenever /--~:a =A b for some p (Luo, 1989b). This property of equality 
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reflection gives a good justification of the practice in program specifications 
in ECC, where Leibniz’s equality is used to reflect computational equality 
(cf., Burstall, 1989). However, it needs further investigations to see whether 
and how such a calculus can be further developed and put into practice as 
a real specification and programming language. 
Further extensions of ECC are possible. Inductive types at the 
predicative levels (cf., Coquand and Paulin, 1989; Ore, 1989) may be very 
useful for program specification and construction. It may be possible to 
give model-theoretic justifications of such extensions by further extending 
the framework of w-sets; but it is still not clear how this can be done. 
An interactive proof development system LEG0 (Pollack, 1989; Luo 
et al., 1989) has been implemented by Pollack in Edinburgh. It supports 
several type theories, of which ECC is the strongest at the current time. 
Further experience with the system should lead to a powerful environment 
for proof development and program specification. 
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